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Third Circuit Review
WARNING!  BARRACUDAS MAY BITE: THIRD CIRCUIT PUTS




Imagine sitting on the sands of the beautiful Buck Island in St. Croix,
Virgin Islands, your feet in the warm sea, when suddenly you feel a stun-
ning blow to your foot—you look down to see blood spewing from your
severed toes and a flash of barracuda tail swimming away from you.1  How
were you supposed to know that you were at risk for a shoreline barracuda
attack?  In S.R.P. v. United States,2 twelve-year-old Sergio Perez (Perez)
must have wondered the same thing when a barracuda attacked him while
visiting Buck Island, a National Monument operated by the National Park
Service (NPS).3  After undergoing surgery to reattach his nearly severed
toes, Perez unsuccessfully tried to recover damages from the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).4  Through his mother, Perez
sued the NPS for failing to warn him of the possibility that a barracuda
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law.  Many thanks to
the current and former editors of the Villanova Law Review for their advice and
feedback throughout the writing and editing processes.  Without the unwavering
support of my friends and family, especially my husband, Eric Johnson, this
Casebrief would not have been possible.
1. See S.R.P. v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 2012) (recounting
facts of case); Thomas Goreau, Barracuda Attack, UNDERCURRENT (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.undercurrent.org/blog/2011/01/04/barracuda-attack/ (retelling sto-
ries of barracuda attacks and describing one attack as “[a] stunning blow” and
another as “a flash”).
2. 676 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2012).
3. See id. at 330 (detailing how barracuda attack occurred on Buck Island, “a
unit of the National Park System under the control and management of the Na-
tional Park Service”).
4. See id. (discussing facts and procedural history, including district court’s
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to application of discretionary
function exception); see also Pat Murphy, Is Park Service Liable for Barracuda Attack?,
BENCHMARKS (Apr. 11, 2012), http://lawyersusaonline.com/benchmarks/2012/
04/11/is-park-service-liable-for-barracuda-attack/ (discussing Third Circuit opin-
(773)
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could attack him while he was on the shore.5  The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands’
dismissal of the case, finding that the NPS’s failure to warn of a shoreline
barracuda attack fell within the ambit of the discretionary function excep-
tion to the FTCA.6
Though the government generally waives its sovereign immunity for
tort claims under the FTCA, certain discretionary decisions made by state
actors remain immune pursuant to the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA.7  The Third Circuit in S.R.P. broadly construed the discretion-
ary function exception but recognized two additional criteria in analyzing
whether a government action involved a discretionary decision.8  These
two criteria are: whether the government knew about the specific risk of
injury, and whether the remedial steps necessary to warn about that risk
are “garden-variety.”9  Concurring in the decision, Judge Roth wrote sepa-
rately to express the fear that evaluating FTCA claims under these two
additional criteria will “eviscerate” the discretionary function exception al-
together.10  This casebrief, however, argues that the majority appropriately
ion dealing with liability issue for National Park Service regarding barracuda attack
at Buck Island in 2004).
5. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 330–31 (discussing facts of case including how acci-
dent occurred, and lack of warning specifically addressing shoreline barracuda at-
tacks on signage and in brochure given to visitors).
6. See id. at 330 (affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction because of discretionary function exception to FTCA).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (granting federal courts original jurisdiction
over civil suits against United States for negligence of state actors); Id. § 2680(a)
(providing exception to Section 1346 waiver of immunity for claims based upon
state actor’s “exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty”).
8. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 338 (recognizing risk of “overly broad construction”
in that “it could easily swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity
and frustrate the purpose of the statute”).  In further discussion, the court rea-
soned that “where the Government is aware of a specific risk and responding to
that risk would only require the Government to take garden-variety remedial steps,
the discretionary function exception does not apply.” Id.; see also Murphy, supra
note 4 (discussing how Third Circuit Judge D. Michael Fisher “thr[e]w the plain-
tiffs’ bar a bone, recognizing that” government’s knowledge of specific risk of in-
jury and garden-variety type of remedy for that risk will render discretionary
function exception inapplicable).  For a further discussion of the court’s analysis,
see infra notes 109–37 and accompanying text.
9. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 338 (acknowledging that knowledge of risk and garden-
variety type of remedy bar application of discretionary function exception accord-
ing to Third Circuit jurisprudence).
10. Id. at 345 (Roth, J., concurring) (“[M]y concern [is] that the majority’s
opinion will eviscerate the discretionary function exception by inserting an im-
proper element into the analysis of whether sovereign immunity has been waived
under the FTCA.”).  Judge Roth opines that these two elements “are both irrele-
vant . . . [and] should not remove the shield of sovereign immunity.” Id.  Although
Judge Roth rejects the use of both the knowledge and garden-variety criteria, she
mainly took issue with the latter. See id. at 348 (“I would apply the discretionary
function exception here to bar waiver of sovereign immunity—without the ‘gar-
den-variety’ condition imposed by the majority.”).
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puts “teeth” into an otherwise “toothless standard” of the discretionary
function analysis that would threaten to deprive meritorious tort claims
from succeeding against the government.11
Part II discusses the statutory language of the FTCA and its discretion-
ary function exception, examining how the Supreme Court and appellate
courts, including the Third Circuit, have developed the analysis surround-
ing the exception.12  Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s holding in S.R.P.
that the NPS’s failure to warn of shoreline barracuda attacks was suffi-
ciently discretionary.13  It further analyzes the court’s discussion of the
government’s lack of specific knowledge of the risk of a shoreline barra-
cuda attack and its inability to remedy the risk through garden-variety
measures.14  Part IV discusses the implication of the court’s decision for
practitioners, highlighting how some plaintiffs may still prevail in FTCA
claims involving discretion by incorporating these two criteria in their
arguments.15
11. See id. at 336 (recognizing that discerning whether discretionary decision
is subject to policy analysis is “not a toothless standard that the [G]overnment can
satisfy merely by associating a decision with a regulatory concern”) (alteration in
original) (internal citation omitted).  For a critique of the discretionary function
exception as being overly broad, see James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A
Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538 (2000) (“[T]he dis-
cretionary function exception has swallowed much of the liability the FTCA cre-
ates, leaving many deserving claimants without a remedy.”); Jonathan R. Bruno,
Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 449–50 (2012) (arguing one reason to repeal
discretionary function exception is because it screens out too many “potentially
meritorious claims against the government, including claims in which a federal
official’s carelessness can be proved”); Andrew Hyer, Comment, The Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for a Workable Analysis, 2007
BYU L. REV. 1091, 1149 (2007) (characterizing application of discretionary func-
tion exception per Supreme Court’s most recent test as too broad and proposing
“incentive recognition” approach). But see Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal
Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1138
(2009) (“The FTCA succeeds at the task Congress set for it. . . .  [Serving] as a
drawbridge across the moat of sovereign immunity, providing a remedy for those
claims that fit within the bounds of the drawbridge, comply with the procedures of
the bridge keeper, and avoid the exceptions Congress built into the bridge.”); Har-
old J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1545 (ar-
guing despite variances in interpreting discretionary function exception,
“Congress’s articulation of the exception unquestionably helps preserve
majoritarian policy”).
12. For a brief statutory analysis of the FTCA and its discretionary function
exception, see infra notes 21–29 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of
courts’ interpretation of the scope of the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA, see infra notes 30–97 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of how the court in S.R.P. reached its holding, see infra
notes 113–28 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of additional criteria for analyzing claims under the dis-
cretionary function exception as applied in S.R.P., see infra notes 129–37 and ac-
companying text.
15. For a discussion of how practitioners representing FTCA plaintiffs, as well
as the government, might craft arguments before the Third Circuit as to whether
3
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II. THE CHANGING TIDES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE FTCA
Before Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946, the United States en-
joyed sovereign immunity from tort claims brought against it.16  The
FTCA creates a general waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed
by governmental actors.17  Nevertheless, the FTCA contains numerous ex-
ceptions, including the discretionary function exception.18  The Supreme
Court has interpreted the scope of the discretionary function exception
with increasing breadth, causing some to fear that it is screening out meri-
torious tort claims against the government.19  Due to these concerns, the
Third Circuit recently followed its own precedent and the lead of other
courts by narrowing the discretionary function exception.20
A. The Tidemark Set by Statutory Language of the FTCA
The FTCA grants district courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims
brought against the United States as long as they allege money damages
for personal injury incurred by the negligent acts or omissions of a United
States employee in the scope of employment.21  Additionally, Congress set
forth an interesting analogy: the United States would be liable “under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
the discretionary function exception applies, see infra notes 151–54 and accompa-
nying text.
16. See Figley, supra note 11, at 1107 (discussing extent of American sovereign
immunity before passage of FTCA).  Figley further notes that although “Americans
injured by torts of the federal government could not sue it for damages,” these
claimants could still “petition the government for redress of grievances.” Id.  He
explains that resorting to the “legislative process” was insufficient and eventually
gave way to the passage of the FTCA in 1946, waiving sovereign immunity for tort
claims. See id. at 1107–09.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (waiving immunity from suit for civil actions
against United States for negligence of governmental actors).
18. For a discussion of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA and
a brief statutory analysis, see infra notes 21–29 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the
scope and policy surrounding the discretionary function exception, including the
development and alteration of a two-part test, see infra notes 30–58 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a discussion of United States Courts of Appeals’ decisions in interpret-
ing the discretionary function exception, including the Third Circuit, see infra
notes 59–97 and accompanying text.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (“[D]istrict courts . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . .
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment”).
4
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omission occurred.”22  Thus, under this analogy, a negligent government
actor is subjected to state tort law.23
Of the many exceptions to the FTCA, the most litigated and broadest
is the discretionary function exception.24  This exception provides that the
main provision of the FTCA shall not apply to claims stemming from any
“discretionary function or duty” that the United States’ agent or employee
performs.25  This is true regardless of whether the discretionary function
or duty is abused.26  Procedurally, the discretionary function exception de-
termines whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim.27  If the discretionary function exception applies, the United States
is immune from suit, thus stripping the court of subject-matter jurisdiction
over the claim.28  Congress left the interpretation of what actions are “dis-
cretionary” to the courts to develop.29
22. Id.
23. See Figley, supra note 11, at 1114 (explaining that “the United States’ lia-
bility is like that of a private person, not of a state or municipality,” emphasizing
requirement for “analogous private person liability” as defined by state tort law).
24. See Levine, supra note 11, at 1541 (noting discretionary function excep-
tion is “most gaping and frequently litigated of the FTCA’s exceptions”).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  Thus, the main provisions of Section 1346 do not
apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
26. See id. (providing operational language that if government employee’s ac-
tion is based upon discretionary function, it is protected “whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused”).
27. See id. § 1346(b) (“[T]he district courts, together with the . . . District
Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages . . . .”); see also S.R.P. v. United
States, 676 F.3d 329, 333 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing discretionary function
exception was “jurisdictional on its face,” but also deeming it “analogous to an
affirmative defense”).  In S.R.P., the plaintiff invoked jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 1367(a), and the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674 and
1346(b). See id. at 331–32; see also Figley, supra note 11, at 1109–10 (discussing
jurisdictional grant of FTCA, which defines scope of waiver of sovereign
immunity).
28. See, e.g., Figley, supra note 11, at 1118 (“[U]nless a claim falls within the
specific language of § 1346(b), it is excluded from the FTCA’s general waiver of
sovereign immunity.”).  Figley describes the jurisdictional grant in terms of the
following metaphor: “Absent any of these elements, the claim cannot use the
FTCA as a bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity.” Id.
29. See Hyer, supra note 11, at 1096 (discussing how Congress “provided little
concrete guidance” as to interpreting scope of discretionary function, as other
commentators have suggested as well).
5
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B. From Low Tide to High Tide: Supreme Court Expands the Scope of the
Discretionary Function Exception
Early Supreme Court cases discussing the scope of the discretionary
function exception used the status of the governmental actor to determine
whether the action involved sufficient discretion to confer immunity.30
This interpretation gave way to a two-part test, focusing on the nature of
the governmental actor’s decision and on the actor’s subjective decision-
making process when determining if an action is susceptible to policy
analysis.31
1. First Interpretations: Focus on the Actor’s Role and Separation of Powers
Justifications
The Supreme Court initially framed its analysis of the scope of the
discretionary function exception in terms of the United States actor’s sta-
tus, differentiating between “operational” level and higher-level actors.32
In Dalehite v. United States,33 one of the Court’s first opportunities to inter-
pret the scope of the discretionary function exception, the Court found
that employees who were simply carrying out operations set in place by
“cabinet-level” decision-makers used sufficient discretion to fit under the
exception.34  The Court, after examining the legislative history of the
30. For a discussion of the first discretionary function exception Supreme
Court cases, see infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court developed and modified a
two-part test to determine susceptibility to policy analysis, see infra notes 44–58 and
accompanying text.
32. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955) (discussing
“operational level” distinction and imposing liability on government to same ex-
tent as for “a private individual under like circumstances”); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–37 (1953) (holding that government actors at operational
or administrative level exercise discretion in carrying out directives from higher-
level government employees).
33. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
34. See id. at 35–37 (finding that discretionary function or duty “includes de-
terminations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifica-
tions or schedules of operations”).  The Court further found that the activities of
“subordinates” in accordance with “cabinet-level” directions were immune from
suit because this kind of operational level decision-making had “room for policy
judgment and decision,” giving rise to discretion. Id. To illustrate the full signifi-
cance of the Dalehite case, briefly setting forth its facts may be helpful.  After World
War II, the United States converted the manufacture of ammonium nitrate from a
war-inspired need for explosives to a commercially-driven need for fertilizer both
in the United States and in Europe. See id. at 18–19.  One particular shipment of
this ammonium nitrate fertilizer “produced and distributed . . . according to the
specifications and under the control of the United States” made its way to Texas
City for storage. See id. at 19–22.  Over 2,000 tons of the fertilizer was loaded onto
French ships, which then exploded in the harbor, leveling the city and killing
“many” people. See id. at 22–23.  The ensuing lawsuit was the Supreme Court’s first
chance to interpret the scope of the discretionary function exception. See id. at 17
(granting certiorari “because the case presented an important problem of federal
statutory interpretation [of the Federal Tort Claims Act]”).
6
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FTCA, found that “it was not contemplated that the Government should
be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or func-
tion.”35  The Court, however, declined to define with precision where this
discretionary function ends.36  Instead, it held that the protection af-
forded to higher government actors making decisions also shielded subor-
dinates merely following orders.37
Separation of powers has been touted as one reason for subsequently
developing the Court’s discretionary function exception jurisprudence
cautiously.38  This view is clearly expressed in United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),39 where the Court refocused
the scope of the discretionary function exception to “the challenged acts
of a Government employee—whatever his or her rank.”40  The Court in-
terpreted Congress’s intent as wishing to “prevent judicial ‘second-guess-
ing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”41
Thus, the discretionary function exception was the “boundary” between
allowing tort claims against the federal government to succeed and pro-
35. Id. at 27–28.
36. See id. at 35 (finding it “unnecessary to define, apart from this case, pre-
cisely where discretion ends”).  The Court’s next case affirmed the status-based
distinction in the scope of the discretionary function exception and took up the
issue of the private person analogy expressed in the main provision of the FTCA.
See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 68–69 (“The broad and just purpose which the
[FTCA] was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the
conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a
private person would be liable.”).
37. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 (“Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion.  It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carry-
ing out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot
be actionable.”).
38. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 11, at 1530–31 (“Judicial review could impede
majoritarian policymaking if judges were empowered to review certain discretion-
ary executive branch actions for their reasonableness or to force the executive
branch to uphold contractual obligations that it believes are no longer in the na-
tion’s best interests.”). But see Bruno, supra note 11, at 435–38 (criticizing scholars’
arguments that discretionary function immunity preserves balance of powers that
would otherwise “be compromised were such [policy] judgment subject to judicial
review through the adjudication of tort claims”).  Bruno proposes that this fear of
legislative and agency policy-making being subjected to judicial review in areas
where the judiciary has no experience is “exaggerated.” See id. at 438.  Bruno ar-
gues that the negligence framework allows judges to review tort claims without
“overstep[ping] their legal authority or competence” in deciding tort claims
against the government. See id. at 440.  He states:
The question presented by a tort claim that arises from some federal em-
ployee’s policy-based decision is not whether, in the abstract, the decision
taken was sound or wise . . . .  [But rather] whether, in light of existing
case law, the allegedly tortious acts or omissions at issue constituted
breach of some valid duty of care owed to the plaintiffs.
Id.
39. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
40. Id. at 813.
41. Id. at 814.
7
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tecting the government’s role in exercising discretion while creating and
implementing important policy goals.42  But this did little to clarify what
Dalehite declined to define: where the discretionary function exception
does not apply.43
2. The Supreme Court’s Two-Part Test
Four years later in Berkovitz v. United States,44 the Supreme Court iden-
tified two particular instances where the discretionary function exception
does not bar a plaintiff’s tort claim: where policy “leaves no room for an
official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act,” and where
an act simply does not involve the exercise of judgment.45  The Court also
set forth a two-part test meant to analyze tort claims in light of the discre-
tionary function exception.46  The first part asks whether any regulations,
policies, or statutes specifically mandate a course of action that ultimately
gives rise to the tort claim.47  If so, the government employee or actor has
no business exercising discretion in the first place, and the discretionary
function exception necessarily does not apply.48  However, if there is no
such regulation mandating a specific course of action, or if the regulation
is sufficiently broad enough to allow discretion within its bounds, courts
should advance to the second part of the test: whether the discretion exer-
cised is the kind of discretion that the exception is designed to protect.49
Almost three years after Berkovitz, in United States v. Gaubert,50 the Su-
preme Court transformed this two-part test and expanded the scope of the
42. See id. at 808 (“The discretionary function exception . . . marks the bound-
ary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States
and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by
private individuals.”).
43. For a discussion of where the Dalehite court declined to extend the scope
of the discretionary function exception, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
45. See id. at 546–47 (“[I]f the [govermental actor’s] policy leaves no room for
an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act
simply does not involve the exercise of such judgment, the discretionary function
exception does not bar a claim that the act was negligent or wrongful.”).
46. See id. at 536 (setting forth two-part test).
47. See id. (discussing how existence of “a federal statute, regulation, or pol-
icy” that “specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow” leaves
that employee with “no rightful option but to adhere to the directive”).  The Court
reasoned that if the employee is forced to follow these directives, then this is not a
meaningful exercise of discretion that would allow the discretionary function ex-
ception to apply. See id.
48. See id. (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element
of judgment or choice.”).
49. See id. (reasoning that if employee has no specific mandatory directive to
follow and “the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must
determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield”).
50. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
8
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discretionary function exception.51  It found that “each of the regulatory
actions in question involved the kind of policy judgment that the discre-
tionary function exception was designed to shield.”52  Moreover, the
Court emphasized that governmental action need not have actually re-
sulted from an exercise of policy judgment.53  Rather, the focus of discre-
tionary function analysis is “on the nature of the actions taken and on
whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”54  This line of the decision
essentially altered the second part of the Berkovitz test to whether actions
are “susceptible to policy analysis.”55  As a result, some commentators have
pointed to the second part of the test as the source of much inconsistency
within the circuits after Gaubert.56  For instance, the lack of a clear stan-
dard in the second part of the test has led to partisan-based results.57
51. See Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analy-
sis: United States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 456 (1997) (discussing Justice White’s “single sentence
that changed the entire focus of the exception”).  Peterson and Van Der Weide
argue that Justice White “provided neither explanation nor authority for his trans-
formation of the second prong of the Berkovitz test.” Id.  They note the “inquiry
moved from the realm of the factual to the realm of the hypothetical” when the
nature of the actions, not the actor’s subjective intent, became the focus of discre-
tionary function exception analysis. Id.; see also Bruno, supra note 11, at 429 (dis-
cussing how Supreme Court sought partly to “correct the Fifth Circuit’s
proposition that ‘operational’ or low-level management decisions necessarily fall
outside the scope of the government’s discretionary function immunity”).  The
Gaubert Court sought to resolve the agency issue framed in Dalehite, and in doing
so, it expanded the scope of the discretionary function exception. See id.
52. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 332.  Here, the governmental actions at issue were the
alleged negligence of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Home
Loan Bank-Dallas in “carrying out their supervisory activities.” Id. at 318.  The
plaintiff, chairman of the board and the largest shareholder of a federally insured
savings and loan, lost millions of dollars in a poorly supervised merger. See id. at
319–20.  The Court found that the federal banking regulations on point “estab-
lished governmental policy which is presumed to have been furthered when the
regulators exercised their discretion to choose from various courses of action in
supervising [one of the merged entities].” Id. at 332.
53. See Bruno, supra note 11, at 429 (discussing how Gaubert Court addressed
longstanding “ambiguity in the case law as to whether a government agent’s action,
in order to fall within the discretionary function exception, must have actually
been the product of policy judgment”).
54. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
55. See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 51, at 456 (discussing effect of
Justice White’s alteration of second part of Berkovitz test).
56. See, e.g., 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 10:6 (2d ed. 2013) (stating that “courts are not entirely
in agreement over the scope of the discretionary function exception,” particularly
for recreation cases).
57. See Robert C. Longstreth, Does the Two-Prong Test for Determining Applicability
of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to
Avoid Judicial Partisanship?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 398, 399 (2011) (“[F]ederal Re-
publican-nominated judges are more likely than Democratic-nominated judges to
find that the discretionary function exception bars tort actions against the federal
government.”).  Judge Longstreth determined the partisanship of the judges ac-
cording to the party of the President who nominated them. See id. at 398–99.  He
9
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Others argue that Gaubert made it easier for the government to prevail
under the discretionary function exception.58
C. There Are Plenty of Fish in the Sea: Interpretive Differences Among Courts
Tracing the spectrum of decisions hinging on the applicability of the
discretionary function exception shows that courts’ analyses are subjective
and fact-driven.59  Distinguishing design from implementation, balancing
safety considerations, knowledge of prior similar risks, ability to perform
routine maintenance and repair work, and budgetary issues all surface as
themes throughout the sea of cases.60  Although some courts have found
the discretionary function exception inapplicable under these themes, the
lack of a bright-line rule has led to more favorable decisions for the gov-
ernment since Gaubert.61
then proposed that, if the second prong of the discretionary function exception
were sufficiently clear in terms of offering guidance to courts, there should be no
variance among Republican and Democrat judges. See id. at 399.  His findings indi-
cated that there was little variance among decisions that turned on the first prong
of the test (whether there was a federal statute on point to eliminate discretion),
while Democratic-nominated judges were three times more likely than Republican-
nominated judges to find that “the conduct at issue was not susceptible to policy
analysis” in the second prong. See id. at 406.  He concluded his article by arguing
that “reducing the open-ended nature of the inquiry under the second prong” will
help rein in some of the seemingly partisan biased opinions. See id. at 407.
58. See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 51, at 465 (noting that “cases
bear . . . out” the prediction that after Gaubert “the proportion of government
defendants able to satisfy the second prong of the Berkovitz test and obtain discre-
tionary function immunity” would increase).
59. See, e.g., Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[O]ur case law may not be in complete harmony on this issue, which is perhaps
the inevitable result of such a policy-specific and fact-driven inquiry.”).  The court
in Terbush further noted that the struggle courts engage in is marked by their re-
luctance to create bright-line rules, in keeping with Supreme Court precedent,
which likewise refuses to “create formulaic categories.” See id. at 1129–30 (discuss-
ing Supreme Court and lower court precedent refusing to create hard rules for
classifications of conduct).  Courts have instead chosen to define discretionary ac-
tivity along a spectrum. See O’Toole v. United States, 295 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir.
2002) (describing analysis under second prong of test as falling along spectrum).
As the court in O’Toole explained, at one end of the spectrum, “agency decisions
[are] totally divorced from the sphere of policy analysis,” as in car accidents caused
by government actors. Id.  At this end, the discretionary function exception does
not apply because “[t]he ‘discretion’ exercised by the negligent government driver
is just not the kind of decisionmaking” meant to be shielded. Id.  At the other end
of the spectrum, “agency actions [are] fully grounded in regulatory policy, where
the government employee’s exercise of judgment is directly related to effectuating
agency policy goals.” Id.  These types of decisions are meant to be shielded, such
as regulating airline safety. See id. (citations omitted).
60. For a discussion of the themes that courts draw on in discretionary func-
tion exception analysis, see infra notes 62–97 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of successful plaintiffs facing the discretionary function
exception, as well as those cases where immunity is conferred, see infra notes
70–97 and accompanying text.
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1. The Design-Implementation Distinction and Safety
Some discretionary decisions that involved design work, such as road
design, were protected by the discretionary function exception.62  On the
other hand, when a decision involved merely implementing a design, any
discretion involved was generally not the kind protected by the discretion-
ary function exception.63  This is particularly true in cases where the im-
plementation of a design mostly involves safety concerns, such as
maintaining a road’s design so that it was safe for higher speeds.64  Balanc-
ing competing safety concerns in implementing a design, however, may be
susceptible to policy analysis.65
62. See, e.g., ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir.
1987) (“Park Service’s decision to design and construct [park road] without guard-
rails was grounded in social and political policy. . . .  [And thus] is protected by the
discretionary function exception.”). But see Soldano v. United States, 453 F.3d
1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding Park Service’s decision to design sign place-
ment along park road was protected by discretionary function exception, but deci-
sion to design part of road with “an unsafe speed limit” did not insulate
government from liability).
63. See, e.g., Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.
2005) (noting trend in case law distinguishing design from implementation and
holding FTCA did not bar plaintiff’s claim for negligence in implementing safety
regulations); Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1995) (re-
jecting government’s argument that implementing safety mandate to post signs
warning of diving hazards involved discretion); cf. Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding fault with plaintiff’s argument that governmental actions
of policy implementation are not protected by discretionary function exception
because this argument “is merely an effort to establish yet another in a long series
of ‘analytical frameworks’ that the Supreme Court has rejected as an inappropriate
means of addressing the discretionary function exemption”) (citation omitted).
64. See, e.g., Soldano, 453 F.3d at 1150–51 (reasoning that Park Service’s deci-
sion to design road without guard rail near vista point may have involved discre-
tion but setting speed limit near vista point inconsistent with design choice was
unsafe for park visitors and not protected by discretionary function exception);
Whisnant, 400 F.3d at 1181 (“[M]atters of scientific and professional judgment—
particularly judgments concerning safety—are rarely considered to be susceptible
to social, economic, or political policy.”); ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 195–96
(holding that, in contrast to designing park road without guardrail, neglecting to
maintain road in safe condition subjected United States to liability when tour bus
drove off road).
65. See Bailey v. United States, 623 F.3d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
United States Army Corps of Engineers immune under discretionary function ex-
ception because it had to balance competing safety considerations, rendering deci-
sion policy-oriented).  The plaintiff-decedent in Bailey drowned when his boat went
over a submerged dam, where warning signs had been washed away and not re-
placed. See id. at 858–59 (discussing facts).  The Corps had to balance the risk that
its employees might encounter dangerous water when trying to replace the signs
with the risk that boaters would not be warned of the upcoming submerged dam.
See id. at 862 (noting balancing).  The court determined this was a balancing act of
“competing policy interests” and was thus susceptible to policy analysis under the
discretionary function exception. See id.  The dissent argued this was inconsistent
with case law establishing that “safety considerations are not policy considerations.”
Id. at 866 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
11
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2. Budgetary Considerations
Governmental actors are frequently faced with a choice of how to allo-
cate scarce funds when making a decision that could fall under the discre-
tionary function exception.66  But, budgetary considerations themselves
have generally not been accepted as legitimate policy concerns.67  Courts
have recognized that budgetary concerns underlie virtually any decision a
governmental actor must make, undoubtedly leading to the discretionary
function exception swallowing the whole of the FTCA.68  An exception has
been made, however, when concerns with how to budget limited funds
were balanced against virtually unlimited natural hazards for which warn-
ings could be given.69
3. Failure to Warn Cases: Policies Granting Discretion
Courts are “not entirely in agreement” over the scope of the discre-
tionary function exception in recreation cases involving “low-level govern-
mental actions,” as in the decision of whether to warn of certain
dangers.70  Often, when a regulation or statute grants a governmental ac-
tor broad discretion, any decisions regarding warning about hazards has
66. See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 51, at 498–500 (discussing cost
considerations of governmental agencies).
67. See, e.g., Cope, 45 F.3d at 449 (rejecting government’s argument that “un-
derlying fiscal constraints should therefore exempt ‘virtually all government activ-
ity’”); ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 196 (holding decisions of how to allocate
funds for maintaining park system were not intended to confer immunity).
68. See, e.g., Cope, 45 F.3d at 449 (discussing how government’s budgetary ar-
gument leads to idea that governmental decisions that “involve choice and the
faintest hint of policy concerns are discretionary and subject to the exception”).
The Cope court remarked that this argument would “allow the exception to swallow
the FTCA’s sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (citation omitted); see also
ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 196 (“Budgetary constraints underlie virtually all
governmental activity.”); Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 51, at 498–500
(explaining interaction between budget considerations and adoption of safety pre-
cautions, but recognizing that “courts’ acceptance of budgetary constraints as a
‘policy’ factor is understandable”).  Peterson and Van Der Weide argue, however,
that the Supreme Court has never officially recognized budget constraints as a
policy factor and that courts should not permit private or public organizations to
avoid liability on budgetary considerations. See id. at 501.  Instead, “discretionary
function immunity should only be available for decisions of a uniquely governmen-
tal—i.e., policy—nature” without considering monetary resources. Id.
69. See Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that National Park Service, “[f]aced with limited resources and unlimited natural
hazards,” was protected in making policy decisions balancing “goal of public safety
against competing fiscal concerns as well as the danger of an overproliferation of
warnings”); see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“[P]ark officials must weigh the cost of safety measures against the additional
safety that will be achieved.  Even inexpensive signs may not be worth their cost.”).
70. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 56 (surveying decisions in recrea-
tion cases that interpret scope of discretionary function exception and comparing
results by circuit).
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also been protected under the discretionary function exception.71  Yet,
there are exceptions to this general rule, such as decisions to zone a partic-
ular property, as articulated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boyd
v. United States.72  The decision of whether to zone water was considered
discretionary because it exhibited a balance between expenditures on
safety and recreational use; however, the court held the decision to neg-
lect to warn of dangerous conditions in an unzoned water area simply did
not involve discretion.73
Similarly, in Smith v. United States,74 the Tenth Circuit considered the
decision to leave an area undeveloped as sufficiently discretionary, but de-
termined that the choice not to warn or safeguard this area from danger
was not an exercise of discretion.75  Conversely, in Elder v. United States,76
the Tenth Circuit found that the decision not to post additional warning
signs was continuing a course of action undertaken to provide warning
and thus was discretionary because the decision was sufficiently grounded
in social and economic policy.77
4. Knowledge of Risk of Harm and “Garden-Variety” Remedy
The Third Circuit’s additional two elements of knowledge and gar-
den-variety remedies are not entirely novel within Third Circuit prece-
dent.78  Other courts have also considered these elements in analyzing
71. See, e.g., Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing NPS’s “decisions as to the precise manner” of warning public about open but
unmaintained trails in winter “clearly [fell] within the discretionary function ex-
ception”); Valdez, 56 F.3d at 1179 (finding NPS was not liable in following guide-
lines that vested it with discretion in carrying out “general policy goals regarding
visitor safety”). But see Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Forest Serv., 514 F.3d 989,
998 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding Forest Service liable for failing to warn of known
hazard on snowmobile trail despite discretion granted as to how to warn visitors).
72. 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
73. See id. at 897 (upholding jurisdiction for plaintiff’s claim for husband’s
wrongful death when he was struck by boat and killed in unzoned waters because
decision not to warn at all was not discretionary, even though decision whether to
zone waters or not was susceptible to policy analysis).
74. 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
75. See id. at 877 (holding that decision to leave area undeveloped was discre-
tionary under discretionary function exception, but failing to post warning signs or
provide safeguards around super-heated thermal pool was not discretionary).
76. 312 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2002).
77. See id. at 1180 (finding that discretionary function exception applied to
decision not to post more warning signs or erect more barriers in area where
young boy slipped on algae and died while crossing stream in national park).
78. See, e.g., Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 752, 757 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding “subsequent decisions concerning the [parking] lot were not necessarily
protected” due to NPS’s failure to address known dangerous condition); Gotha v.
United States, 115 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (characterizing case of failing to
install handrails along dark pathway “mundane, administrative, garden-variety,
housekeeping problem”).
13
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whether the discretionary function exception applies.79  It is not clear,
however, whether these courts intended the additional elements to be in-
corporated into an analysis of the susceptibility to policy analysis.80
a. Knowledge
Courts have found that when a governmental actor has reason to
know about a specific risk of injury or harm but does nothing about it,
future injuries of the same kind have rendered the discretionary function
exception inapplicable.81  Some courts have discussed the knowledge ele-
ment as an important factor, while others have refused to review it as a
matter of refraining from impermissible judicial review of policy deci-
sions.82  Specifically within the Third Circuit, in Cestonaro v. United States,83
the court found the discretionary function exception did not bar the
plaintiff’s claim of negligent maintenance of a parking lot.84  In that case,
the plaintiff filed a claim on behalf of her husband, who was killed by an
armed gunman in an unofficial parking lot in Christiansted National His-
toric Site—a lot maintained by the NPS.85  The court noted that the NPS,
though aware of crimes committed in the area and regular safety com-
plaints around the lot, did not take any further actions in deterring night-
time parking at the lot.86  The court emphasized that susceptibility analysis
“is not a toothless standard that the government can satisfy merely by asso-
ciating a decision with a regulatory concern.”87  The court ultimately held
the discretionary function exception did not apply because the court was
unable to find a “rational nexus” between the NPS’s inaction in maintain-
ing the lot and its stated discretionary function of balancing concerns for
historic preservation with safety.88
79. For a discussion of other courts the Third Circuit relied on in S.R.P. when
discussing these two elements, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit utilized these two criteria in
S.R.P., see infra notes 129–50 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Forest Serv., 514 F.3d 989, 998
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding Forest Service liable due to its knowledge of hazard on
snowmobile trail through its own investigation sixteen days before plaintiff was
injured, and its failure to warn about hazard); Cope v. United States, 45 F.3d 445,
452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that government’s decisions on how and where to
post warning signs for dangerous road condition was not shielded by discretionary
function exception).
82. See, e.g., Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that NPS’s determination not to warn public about rockfall that occurred
three weeks prior to plaintiff’s injury in subsequent rockslide was “precisely the
kind of determination that is protected from [the court’s] review”).
83. 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir. 2000).
84. See id. at 757 (discussing court’s holding).
85. See id. at 751 (discussing facts of case).
86. See id. at 752 (indicating court’s reasoning).
87. Id. at 755 (citation omitted).
88. See id. at 759 (noting failure to find decision related to policy).
14
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b. Ordinary and Routine Maintenance
Some courts discuss repairs in terms of how ordinary or garden-vari-
ety they are.89 Gotha v. United States90 is one example of a Third Circuit
case upholding a claim over the discretionary function exception, offering
a textbook example of the kind of negligence situation where the Third
Circuit is comfortable holding the government liable.91  In Gotha, the
plaintiff fell and injured her ankle while descending a dark, unpaved path-
way on the Navy facility where she was contracted to work.92  She sued
under the FTCA for negligent maintenance of the area, specifically for
failure to light the area adequately and failure to provide a stairway with
handrails.93  The United States argued that constructing such handrails
and lighting could interfere with cables linked to monitoring on-site weap-
ons, which therefore required a discretionary decision grounded in policy
concerns.94  The court found this argument too speculative, noting “[t]his
case is not about a national security concern, but rather a mundane, ad-
ministrative, garden-variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far re-
moved from the policies applicable to the Navy’s mission as it is possible to
get.”95  The court then squared its decision with Gaubert, finding that the
conduct of maintaining the pathway was not sufficiently “grounded in the
policy of the regulatory regime.”96  In its analysis in S.R.P., the Third Cir-
cuit explicitly incorporated the garden-variety remedy and the govern-
ment’s knowledge of a specific risk of harm.97
89. See, e.g., O’Toole v. United States, 295 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing policy analysis for second prong of test as falling along spectrum);
Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that Park
Service’s failure to repair concrete culvert on side of road that plaintiff smashed
car into implicated policy concerns in “[the] decision not to undertake a recon-
struction of all drainage ditches along [the road]” and therefore was “not [a]
‘mundane, administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping problem’”); ARA Leisure
Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding Park Service’s
failure to maintain road safety “falls in the category of ‘ordinary garden-variety
negligence’”).
90. 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1997).
91. See id. at 182 (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of a case more likely to have
been within the contemplation of Congress when it abrogated sovereign immunity
than the one before us.”).
92. See id. at 178 (examining facts of case).
93. See id. (stating plaintiff’s claims).
94. See id. at 181 (discussing government’s argument).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 182 (citing Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991)).
97. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis under S.R.P., see infra
notes 129–50 and accompanying text.
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III. THIRD CIRCUIT PREVENTS THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
FROM SWALLOWING THE FTCA
Perez brought suit against the government for failing to warn him
about a shoreline barracuda attack.98  In reviewing the case, the Third
Circuit first found that the government’s decision not to warn involved the
right kind of discretion under the discretionary function exception; how-
ever, it then analyzed the case in terms of whether the government had
knowledge of the specific risk of a shoreline barracuda attack, and
whether eliminating this risk would involve garden-variety type mea-
sures.99  Though Perez did not succeed under either analysis, the court
opened the door to future plaintiffs who meet the two additional crite-
ria.100  Though the concurrence criticized these criteria as potentially evis-
cerating the discretionary function exception, the majority prevents the
exception from swallowing the whole of the FTCA by aligning it more
closely to the purpose of the FTCA.101
A. Paradise Lost
On May 9, 2004, twelve-year-old Perez was playing on the beach of
Buck Island in the Virgin Islands.102  While sitting on the beach with his
feet in the shallow water, a barracuda attacked him, nearly severing three
of his toes, two of which required surgery to reattach.103  Barracudas do
not typically attack humans, and the NPS was only aware of one other
barracuda attack on a human in Buck Island’s recent history.104  In addi-
tion to warning about other dangerous wildlife, the NPS warned visitors in
a brochure and on signs posted around the island to treat barracudas with
98. For a discussion of the facts and disposition of S.R.P., see infra notes
102–08 and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the court’s analysis of S.R.P., see infra notes 109–28
and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s approach confines the discre-
tionary function exception to a reasonable scope by adding two additional ele-
ments, see infra notes 129–37 and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of the concurrence in S.R.P. and its criticism of the ma-
jority’s approach, see infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
102. See S.R.P. v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing
facts leading to plaintiff’s injury).
103. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s injury).
104. See id. at 331 (discussing how barracudas “are not generally aggressive
toward humans” unless they mistake human limbs for prey, and relating event to
prior attack at Buck Island).  The NPS was aware of one other barracuda attack on
a human at Buck Island that occurred about twenty-two years before Perez’s attack.
See id. (discussing previous barracuda attack on fisherman).  That attack was distin-
guishable from the present one because the fisherman who was attacked allegedly
attracted the barracuda by “pouring fish oil in the water around his feet.” Id.  Ad-
ditionally, several other snorkelers nearby were not attacked in that incident. See
id. (distinguishing fisherman’s attack from present case).
16
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caution.105  Because Perez was injured on a unit of the National Park Sys-
tem controlled and managed by the NPS, Perez, through his mother, filed
suit against the United States under the FTCA for failure to adequately
warn visitors of the dangers posed by barracudas “to shallow water bath-
ers.”106  The District Court for the Virgin Islands dismissed the case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding the discretionary function ex-
ception applied.107  Perez then appealed to the Third Circuit.108
B. The Teeth in the Third Circuit’s Analysis
The court laid out a thorough analysis of the case under the two parts
of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test, finding the NPS’s decision not to post warn-
ings about shoreline barracuda attacks was susceptible to policy analy-
sis.109  After doing so, however, the court considered the implications of
an overly broad interpretation of the discretionary function exception and
how this would frustrate the purpose of the FTCA.110  In response to the
concern that the exception might swallow the FTCA, the court articulated
two new criteria for applying the discretionary function exception that has
roots in Third Circuit precedent: knowledge of the specific risk, and
whether the type of remedy required to address this risk was a routine,
105. See id. (discussing NPS’s efforts to warn of natural hazards on Buck Is-
land).  Visitors can only reach Buck Island by boat, and all private boaters who
reach the island must obtain an anchoring permit. See id. at 330–31 (discussing
accessibility of Buck Island by either private concessionaries or private boat and
detailing process of receiving “Buck Island Reef Brochure”).  The anchor permit
contains “Safety Tips for Sea and Shore,” among other pertinent information,
which states:
Shallows and reefs near shore contain sharp corals, stingrays, spiny sea
urchins, fire coral, fire worms, and barbed snails.  Cuts from marine orga-
nisms infect quickly, so clean and medicate them.  Portuguese man-o-war
and sea wasps, both stinging jellyfish, are rarely found here. Barracuda
and sharks, if encountered, should be treated with caution but are not usually
aggressive toward snorkelers.
Id. at 331 (emphasis added).  This information was also posted in English and in
Spanish on signs in the picnic areas of Buck Island. See id. (detailing posted safety
information).
106. See id. at 330 (stating procedural posture and relationship of Buck Island
Monument to National Park Service).
107. See id. at 347 (discussing district court’s findings).
108. See id. (discussing procedural history).
109. For a discussion of the court’s application of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test,
see infra notes 113–28 and accompanying text.
110. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 338 (“We acknowledge that if the discretionary
function exception is given an overly broad construction, it could easily swallow
the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity and frustrate the purpose of the
statute.”).
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garden-variety type.111  Ultimately, Perez’s claim still failed under this
analysis.112
1. Susceptibility to Policy Analysis
The court began its analysis with the “threshold matter” of “iden-
tify[ing] the conduct at issue.”113  Perez alleged the United States was neg-
ligent specifically for not providing enough warning to shallow water
bathers on the shoreline of barracuda attacks.114  On the other hand, the
United States argued that the NPS was only aware in the “most general
sense” that barracudas were dangerous to humans, not that they “posed a
risk to shoreline swimmers specifically.”115  Thus, the “key dispute” in this
case was how specific or general the government’s knowledge was of the
danger posed by barracudas.116
The court next determined whether any specific regulation mandated
a course of action or, alternatively, whether there was room for discre-
tion.117  The court reviewed the NPS Organic Act, which directs the NPS
to conserve “natural and historic objects” in national parks, as well as some
of the NPS’s internal policies, which provide the NPS’s duty to “remove
known hazards and apply other appropriate measures, including . . . sign-
ing . . . .  [T]hat have the least impact on park resources and values.”118
The court determined that these policies “clearly vest[ed] local NPS offi-
cials with broad discretion” in crafting warnings against natural
hazards.119  Thus, no statute or regulation “mandated any particular
method for warning about marine hazards on Buck Island.”120
111. For a discussion of the court’s consideration of these two additional cri-
teria, see infra notes 129–37 and accompanying text.
112. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 342 (relying on Gotha and Cestonaro to find that
“neither condition for finding the challenged conduct outside the scope of the
discretionary function exception [was] present in this case”).
113. Id. at 332 (internal citation omitted).
114. See id. at 334 (discussing allegations of plaintiff’s complaint).  The NPS
had already provided some warning about the presence of barracudas on Buck
Island, but Perez defined the NPS’s negligent conduct narrowly, alleging that the
existing warnings “appl[ied] only to snorkelers.” Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. (“[K]ey dispute in this case is the extent of the NPS’s knowledge
regarding the dangers posed by barracudas.”).
117. See id. (noting that court must “first determine whether a statute, regula-
tion, or other policy required the NPS to warn of hazardous conditions in a spe-
cific manner, or whether the NPS’s actions were discretionary because they
involved ‘an element of judgment or choice’” (internal citation omitted)).  For a
discussion of the two-part test first set forth in Berkovitz and modified by Gaubert,
see supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text.
118. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 334–35 (internal citation omitted).
119. Id. at 335.  The court agreed with the United States, who argued that
“the question of whether and to what extent to warn involved significant policy
considerations.” Id. at 331–35.
120. Id.  The court aligned its reasoning with other appellate courts address-
ing the NPS’s discretion in warning. See id. at 336 (citing Terbush v. United States,
18
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Because the court found that the NPS used discretion in determining
whether to warn of shoreline barracuda attacks, the court next analyzed
whether this discretion was “susceptible to policy analysis.”121  The court
further noted, “susceptibility analysis is not a toothless standard” that the
government can easily satisfy by pointing to some “regulatory concern.”122
Rather, the court indicated that it would be looking for a “rational nexus”
between the government’s decision and legitimate regime-oriented policy
concerns.123
The NPS’s determination not to post additional warnings regarding
barracudas was susceptible to policy analysis because it involved balancing
safety with overloading visitors with warnings.124  In deciding whether to
warn about a shoreline barracuda attack and by how much, “the NPS had
to weigh the potential benefits of additional warnings against the costs of
such warnings, including the risk of numbing Buck Island visitors to all
warnings.”125  The court considered the “virtually unlimited natural
hazards” present on Buck Island and reasoned that the NPS had to make
“a policy determination” about which hazards to address and how to best
advise visitors of their dangers.126  Making this determination was “directly
516 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2008); Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
2002); Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 1999); Blackburn v. United
States, 100 F.3d 1426 (9th Cir. 1996); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177 (9th
Cir. 1995)) (discussing First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit cases dealing with NPS’s
decisions to warn or not to warn of dangers).
121. Id. at 336 (quoting Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991)).
The court prefaced its analysis by first discussing the rebuttable presumption that
actions by a governmental actor vested with discretion by legislation are “grounded
in policy.” See id. (discussing rebuttable presumption arising when government
agent may exercise discretion according to statute).  The government agent’s acts
are actually presumed to be “grounded in policy when exercising that discretion”
when it is afforded by a statute. Id.  The court cites Third Circuit precedent for the
idea that the presumption is rebuttable. See id. (citing Cestonaro v. United States,
211 F.3d 749, 755 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000)).
122. Id. (citing Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 755).
123. Id. (citing Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 759).
124. See id. (proceeding to second part of Berkovitz/Gaubert test).
125. Id. (holding that NPS’s decision was right kind of discretion and was thus
susceptible to policy analysis).
126. Id. at 336–37 (concluding that nature of NPS’s decision regarding post-
ing signs involved policy determinations).  Bombarding visitors with signs about
every possible type of danger that could be encountered on the island—in addi-
tion to the warning signs and the brochures already provided by the park service—
would actually run the risk of numbing visitors to dangers. See id. at 337 (discuss-
ing how policy involves determining whether warning involves “overloading visitors
with unnecessary warnings”).  Additionally, it would detract from the natural set-
ting of the island. See id. at 335 (discussing NPS’s internal policies, which direct
NPS officials to take park aesthetics into consideration when contemplating
whether to install signs and other warnings); cf. Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d
1172, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing impact of too many warning signs on
important aesthetic value of Zion National Park’s Emerald Pool, where plaintiff
slipped on algae).  There, the plaintiff challenged the adequacy of the existing
warning signs because no sign specifically addressed the “danger of algae in the
streams” around the waterfall where the plaintiff slipped and died. See id. at
19
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related to the NPS’s mission of preserving national parks” and therefore
grounded in regulatory policy.127  In the court’s view, this was “precisely
the type of policy choice” that judges are prohibited from second-guessing
under the discretionary function exception.128
2. Knowledge and “Garden-Variety” Remedy
After articulating its holding using the Berkovitz/Gaubert test, the court
acknowledged that a broad interpretation of the discretionary function
exception could “swallow” the waiver of sovereign immunity under the
FTCA.129  This would not only frustrate the purpose of the FTCA, but
would also run contrary to congressional intent to impose liability on the
United States for “ordinary common-law torts.”130  In order to reign in an
overly broad construction, the court recognized that it “[has] held that
where the Government is aware of a specific risk and responding to that
risk would only require the Government to take garden-variety remedial
steps, the discretionary function does not apply.”131  Other courts sup-
ported the Third Circuit’s view, incorporating the government’s knowl-
edge of a “specific risk of harm” and “eliminating the danger” not by
“implicat[ing] policy but . . . involv[ing] only garden-variety remedial
measures.”132
1174–75.  The court considered the impact more signage would have on the aes-
thetic value of the site and decided “it would be impossible to resolve Plaintiffs’
negligence claims without evaluating decisions protected by the discretionary func-
tion exception.” Id. at 1183–84.
127. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 336–37 (discussing how NPS’s mission was related to
determination of how to warn, thus part of “policy of regulatory regime” (citing
Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991)).
128. Id. at 337 (discussing judicial concern of not second-guessing policy deci-
sion made by governmental actor).
129. Id. at 338 (“[I]f the discretionary function exception is given an overly
broad construction, it could easily swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign
immunity”).
130. Id. (discussing how discretionary function exception has potential to
“frustrate the purpose” of FTCA and that Supreme Court precedent explains con-
gressional intent to waive immunity for ordinary torts involving basic safety con-
cerns (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953))).
131. See id. (discussing two additional elements of knowledge and garden-vari-
ety remedial steps in preventing discretionary function exception from having
overly broad construction).  The court further noted this interpretation was “con-
sistent with the primary purpose of the FTCA.” Id.
132. See id. at 340 (discussing other circuit court cases’ support before turning
to case at issue); see also Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Forest Serv., 514 F.3d 989,
998 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding failure to warn about or remedy known hazard to
snowmobilers not discretionary due to knowledge of that specific hazard); Fabend
v. Rosewood Hotels & Resorts, 174 F. Supp. 2d 356, 360 n.10 (D.V.I. 2001) (finding
knowledge of specific risk of harm where danger was “well-defined and specific,
not . . . nebulous or hidden”); George v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1524, 1528,
1533 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (holding Forest Service liable because it was on notice of
danger of alligator attack from prior incidents of “aggressive alligator behavior”
and yet it failed to remedy that danger); Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 896,
898 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding decision not to warn swimmers of dangers in un-
20
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The court next launched into an analysis of the government’s
“aware[ness] of a specific risk” and whether “responding to that risk would
only require the Government to take garden-variety remedial steps.”133  In
this case, the NPS was not aware of the specific risk of shoreline barracuda
attacks.134  Referring to the Gotha decision, the court determined that
even if the NPS was on notice of a possible barracuda attack somewhere
off shore, responding to the known hazard would not require “garden-vari-
ety action, such as putting up a rail or installing additional lighting, which
does not implicate any overarching policy concerns.”135  Rather, the NPS’s
“determination regarding the content of warning signs on Buck Island in-
volved significant policy considerations.”136  Therefore, neither the knowl-
edge nor garden-variety type remedy criteria would place this discretionary
decision outside of the discretionary function analysis.137
C. S.R.P. May Have Lost the Battle, but Future FTCA Plaintiffs
May Win the War
The Third Circuit effectively wrote two decisions in S.R.P.: one using
the susceptibility to policy analysis test under Berkovitz/Gaubert, and an-
other, applying the knowledge and garden-variety remedy elements devel-
oped in its own precedent.138  Interestingly, neither approach saved
zoned area “did not implicate any social, economic, or political policy
judgments”).
133. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 338.
134. See id. at 340 (“[T]he NPS was not aware of a specific risk.”).  In a foot-
note, the court conceded that it was “possible that the NPS could be aware of a
safety hazard so blatant that its failure to warn the public could not reasonably be
said to involve policy considerations.” Id. at 340 n.6.  Yet, the court supported the
district court’s finding that although the warning signs indicated that NPS “was
aware in a general sense that barracudas were potentially dangerous, there was no
evidence that NPS officials were or should have been specifically aware of the risk
of a shallow-water attack.” Id. at 340.  The court reviewed the district court’s find-
ing for clear error, which it did not find. See id. (discussing lack of clear error).  An
interesting argument that did not garner the court’s support was that NPS “knew
that barracudas posed a serious risk to shallow-water swimmers” because of the
recent policies of the Secretary of the Interior prohibiting fishing in the area so as
to “increase the barracuda population.” Id. at 341.  The court did not find the
district court to have clearly erred in finding little merit in this argument. See id.
(dismissing argument).
135. Id. (assuming “arguendo, that the NPS was aware of the risk” and deter-
mining whether the required response to that risk is garden-variety).  The court
was referring to its decision in Gotha, where installing handrails was not related to
naval policy. See Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (“This
case is not about a national security concern, but rather a mundane, administra-
tive, garden-variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far removed from the
policies applicable to the Navy’s mission as it is possible to get.”).
136. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 342.
137. See id. at 340 (“[N]either condition for finding the challenged conduct
outside the scope of the discretionary function exception is present in this case.”).
138. For a discussion of the court’s dual approaches to the case, see infra
notes 140–50 and accompanying text.
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S.R.P.’s failure to warn claim because the discretionary function exception
applied under both modes of analysis.139  The court discussed its motive
for analyzing the case under two additional criteria as preventing the dis-
cretionary function exception from rendering the FTCA useless.140  One
commentator noted that the court may have simply “throw[n] the plain-
tiffs’ bar a bone.”141  Regardless, the Third Circuit opened the door for
future plaintiffs who can successfully prove these two criteria.142
Whether the government has the requisite knowledge under the
Third Circuit’s approach depends on the specificity of the risk of harm.143
In S.R.P., the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the government
failed to warn him in a very specific way because warnings to treat bar-
racudas with caution already existed in brochures and on signs around
Buck Island.144  Without a previous barracuda attack to a shoreline bather,
and with only one other barracuda attack in over twenty years on the is-
land, the government was on better footing.145
139. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 336–37, 341 (holding that “NPS’s decision not to
post additional warning signs” was “susceptible to policy analysis” and that even if
NPS had knowledge of specific risk of harm, it could not eliminate this risk without
consulting policy considerations).
140. See id. at 338 (recognizing risk that broad interpretation of discretionary
function exception could “easily swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign
immunity and frustrate the purpose of the statute”).
141. See Murphy, supra note 4 (discussing Third Circuit’s decision in S.R.P.
and noting that, though majority favored government in this case, it did offer two
considerations for future plaintiffs to bring suit against government where govern-
ment was aware of specific risk of harm and had garden-variety way of fixing it).
142. See id. (considering effect of decision on plaintiffs); see also S.R.P., 676
F.3d at 345 (Roth, J., concurring) (predicting that “majority’s opinion will eviscer-
ate the discretionary function exception by inserting an improper element into the
analysis”).
143. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 340–42 (majority opinion) (discussing how one
prior barracuda attack on human in “deeper water” was not sufficient to put NPS
on notice of “the risk of a shallow-water attack”).  The court emphasized that the
“key question” for the knowledge element is “not whether the Government was
aware of danger in the most general sense, but whether it was on notice of a spe-
cific hazard.” Id. at 342.
144. See id. at 341 (discussing Perez’s argument that existing warnings were
not sufficient to warn him of shallow-water attack).  In fact, Perez set forth evi-
dence that he claimed the district court ignored. See id. (noting plaintiff’s claim).
He alleged the brochure was insufficient because it merely advised snorkelers to
treat barracudas with caution, saying nothing about the risk of an attack on the
shoreline. See id. (detailing plaintiff’s claim).  Furthermore, if the deeper water
attack was attributed to pouring fish oil in the water, the NPS failed to prevent
future attacks on the shore by warning beachgoers not to put food in the water. See
id. (same).  Finally, Perez alleged that “splashing in the ‘shallows’ was a risk factor
which increases the likelihood of a barracuda attack.” Id.  The court found all of
these arguments unpersuasive. See id. (noting court’s conclusion).
145. See id. at 341–42 (discussing previous barracuda attacks at Buck Island
and how NPS structured its warnings around belief that barracudas generally were
not aggressive toward humans); cf. Francis v. United States, No. 2:08CV244 DAK,
2011 WL 1667915, at *1, *8 (D. Utah May 3, 2011) (awarding plaintiff, who was
killed by bear at campsite, damages under FTCA for Forest Service’s failure to
22
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The garden-variety remedy is perhaps more promising to future tort
plaintiffs in suits against the government.146  Judge Roth, concurring in
S.R.P., wrote separately to express her concern that “inserting an im-
proper element into the analysis” would “eviscerate the discretionary func-
tion exception.”147  She disagreed with the majority’s holding that the
knowledge element required the garden-variety type of remedy in order to
keep it within the discretionary function exception.148  But perhaps the
majority is right in doing exactly what the concurrence accuses it of doing
wrong: qualifying its holding with additional elements in the analysis.149
Rather than “eviscerating” the discretionary function exception, the addi-
tional elements put “teeth” in an otherwise wide-open analysis that could
prevent meritorious tort claims from succeeding against the
government.150
warn campers of previous bear attack at same campsite just twelve hours prior to
plaintiff’s attack).
146. For a discussion of cases where plaintiffs have been successful because of
the government’s failure to address ordinary, routine, or garden-variety repairs or
maintenance, see supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
147. S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 345 (Roth, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 346–47 (discussing how majority unnecessarily “limit[s] [its]
holding by stating that ‘where the Government is aware of a specific risk and re-
sponding to that risk would only require the Government to take garden-variety
remedial steps, the discretionary function exception does not apply’”).  The con-
currence notes that it is this final element—the garden-variety requirement—that
the circuit judge takes issue with. See id. at 347 (“It is this ‘garden-variety’ language
which has prompted my concurrence.”).  One problem the concurrence sees with
this language is that it is hard to define what a garden-variety remedy is. See id.
(discussing difficulty in differentiating between garden-variety warning sign from
one that is not).  Judge Roth further argued:
[I]f the determination of the hazard is protected by the discretionary
function exception but the risk of liability depends on whether the reme-
dial steps to correct or warn of this risk are “garden-variety,” or not, ha-
ven’t we eviscerated the exception?  Haven’t we protected policy choices
which require expensive, extensive, or complicated remedies, but left the
NPS open to liability if the remedy is simple or inexpensive?
Id.
149. See id. at 346–47 (discussing how majority qualifies its holding that discre-
tionary function exception does not apply in this case because decision not to warn
was susceptible to policy analysis).
150. See id. at 345 (accusing majority of eviscerating discretionary function
exception); see id. at 338 (majority opinion) (discussing concern that discretionary
function exception interpreted too broadly will swallow FTCA waiver of sovereign
immunity); see also Bruno, supra note 11, at 449–50 (discussing how repealing dis-
cretionary function exception will allow meritorious tort claims to proceed where
carelessness on behalf of governmental employee can be proven); Hyer, supra note
11, at 1149 (proposing incentive recognition approach to narrow scope of discre-
tionary function exception); Levine, supra note 11, at 1538 (proposing administra-
tive framework that will preserve remedies for those with valid tort claims);
Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 51, at 502 (recommending that “discretion-
ary function immunity be reserved for actual decisions about true policy factors
made by officials with policy-making authority”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Practitioners wishing to take advantage of these two criteria should
still be wary: the more specific the plaintiff’s injury is without a corre-
sponding history of similar injuries, the less likely the court will find that
the government was on notice of that specific risk of harm.151  Further-
more, the remedy for this risk must be garden-variety in the sense that it
does not involve significant policy considerations that relate to the regula-
tory regime.152  The government still enjoys immunity if it can craft argu-
ments that generalize the scope of the decision-making power it grants to
its employees.153  Moreover, the concurrence in S.R.P. also offers the argu-
ment that applying the garden-variety remedy to a known risk of harm
could widely expose the United States to tort liability that Congress never
intended.154
Although S.R.P. could have been resolved simply under the Berkovitz/
Gaubert analysis, the Third Circuit added the extra considerations of the
government’s knowledge of the specific risk of harm and whether elimi-
nating this risk involves garden-variety type remedies.155  These additional
criteria do not completely destroy the discretionary function exception,
but instead add teeth to the exception by giving future plaintiffs more
arguments in pursuit of claims that might otherwise be barred by the dis-
cretionary function exception.156  By adding teeth to the discretionary
function exception analysis, the Third Circuit ensures that the exception
does not swallow the statute waiving sovereign immunity.157
151. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 340–42 (discussing how NPS was not aware of spe-
cific risk of shoreline barracuda attack).
152. See id. at 342 (finding supposed responses to known risk of shoreline
barracuda attack would involve policy considerations “regarding the content of
warning signs”).
153. For a discussion of policies that granted broad discretionary power to its
employees, where the discretion was susceptible to policy analysis, see supra notes
70–77 and accompanying text.
154. See S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 345 (Roth, J., concurring) (accusing majority of
“inserting an improper element into the analysis of whether sovereign immunity
has been waived under the FTCA”).
155. See id. (discussing how majority limits its holding).
156. For a discussion of the value of the two additional criteria set forth by the
Third Circuit in S.R.P., see supra notes 138–50 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the court’s analysis, see supra notes 113–50 and ac-
companying text.
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